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ABSTRACT
This paper debates the relationships between transition and 
urbanization by problematizing the operation of transition on 
three inter-related levels. Firstly, at the level of ideology, it is 
important to rehearse the understanding of transition from 
that of merely area-based reforms and rather understand it 
as a totalizing project of planetary reach, which completes 
the subjugation of the whole world to capitalism and crowns 
neoliberalism as the only global order. Secondly, at the level of 
practice, it is important to properly account for the spatializing 
effects of that ideology – which is not simply “domesticated” 
by local practices, but itself mediates the subsumption of pre-
existing practices by capital, thus alienating them from their 
history. Thirdly, at the level of the urban: while urban change is 
usually portrayed merely as a projection of societal relations, 
the urban is actually the central stage where ideology mixes 
with the everyday, through which the societal change is 
mediated; new meanings, social relations, and class divisions 
are construed; and through which ideological transition 
achieves its practical completeness. What combines these 
three levels is the notion of urbanization of transition, which 
articulates the centrality of the urban in the spectacular post-
socialist experience.
Introduction
Although scholars of post-socialist urbanism at times indulge themselves in reflex-
ive melancholy over their moderate impact on the wider urban scholarship, there 
is actually a fast-growing and already rather sophisticated body of internation-
ally excellent literature that addresses significant challenges and provides diverse 
accounts on many aspects of post-socialist urbanization, both empirically and the-
oretically (for some reviews, see Borén and Gentile 2007; Sykora and Bouzarovski 
2012; Kubeš 2013; Sjöberg 2014). However, I will argue in this paper that the 
relationships between the two key staples feeding this literature – transition and 
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urbanization – are still under-conceptualized, taken at face value, or fail to attract 
their due problematization. In this article, I discuss that point and outline possible 
avenues as to how to problematize those relationships through the lens of a spatial 
political economy.
To begin with, while urban change in post-socialist scholarship is usually por-
trayed as a projection of larger societal changes onto local practices, the urban is 
actually an important scale through which new ideologies, meanings, and social 
relationships are legitimized – there is a dialectical co-production between the 
urban and the social (Lefebvre [1970] 2003, [1974] 1991). The urban is also where 
the wider project of neoliberal transition is “domesticated” into concrete “trans-
formations” (e.g. Stenning et al. 2010); however, the latter observation should not 
blind us from seeing the totality of transition in the first place. The discourse in 
post-socialist scholarship that disavows the vocabulary of “transition” in favor of 
more particularized “transformations” (Pickles and Smith 1998; Herrschel 2007), 
while rightly challenging the reductionist assumptions of the teleological projec-
tions of the Washington Consensus, has become too seductive itself. It has moved 
research from the understanding of the ideology of transition at large to studying 
smaller and particular processes, which per se become somehow sufficient to 
explain post-socialist experiences, while the wider meta-change is at best read 
perfunctorily under the now all-explanatory narrative of “neoliberalism.”
In this paper, I rehearse transition as an ideological, totalizing – indeed, total-
itarian – project and discuss the role of the urban in making it such and render-
ing transition its social constitution. The dialectics of the total and the particular 
leads me to outline the contours of what I call “the urbanization of transition,” the 
appropriation of urban space by capitalism, simultaneously leading to the mate-
rialization, crystallization, and consequent reproduction of the new hegemony. I 
support my argument with some classical writings in political economy; the work 
of Henri Lefebvre in particular offers a useful grammar to knit the urban thread 
through the ideology and practice of transition.
I organize my argument as follows. I start with discussing why transition should 
not be easily equated with contextual transformations, arguing that to do otherwise 
is a debilitating position that obscures the global significance of post-socialism. 
I continue with discussing the totalizing nature of transition, which functions to 
close the civilizational dialog over alternative human futures. I then turn to out-
lining the spatialization of transition – as a contingent but ordered process of the 
subsumption of post-socialist legacy under the exigencies of capital. Against these 
fundamentals, I then discuss post-socialist urbanization and how it is central to 
these epochal and spectacular politico-economic restructurings.
Transformations or transition?
The collapse of the state-socialist project, climaxed in the well-documented geo-
political events of 1989/1991, brought about a surge of radical societal change. 
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Unlike regime change and retrofits in other places and times, the post-socialist 
momentum has rebuilt the very existential foundations of the affected societies – 
whose professed goal was no longer building “the bright future” of communism, 
with its aspirations for a classless society, good life and equity for all, but rather 
embracing the individualistic, entrepreneurial, and competition ethos of capital-
ism, framed politically as a “market economy.” The change has been underpinned 
by so-called “transition,” as a metaphorical and practical framework for the exist-
ence of post-socialist societies. Ex-communist societies were then all seen as soci-
eties in transition, at the core of which was a technocratic package of reforms for 
the economic and political domains.
Since the very start, the teleological notion of transition has been challenged. 
While transition has been both a prescriptive and descriptive idea, many have 
critiqued it for being reductionist and thus failing to account for the complex-
ity and multiplicity of pathways engaged by actually existing transition, which is 
shaped by local preconditions, culture, and contingencies. It has been suggested 
that “transformation(s)” is a more nuanced vocabulary to analyze the processes of 
post-socialism (e.g. Pickles and Smith 1998).
While this is an accurate critique, the downside has been that – coupled with 
descriptive, often empiricist and positivist tendencies in much of the emerging 
post-socialist academic geography – this new tradition has resulted in the topic 
being dominated by the narrative of the idiosyncrasies of post-socialism, including 
the diversity of contextually specific trajectories emerging from the juxtaposition 
of politics, culture, history, and other legacies and exigencies. The “transformation” 
thesis has just gone too well with the empiricist tradition of “area studies,” while the 
very teleology of transition has not been scrutinized on its own terms – as an ide-
ology – it was rather reduced to the presumed Washington Consensus’s technoc-
racies. The most interesting accounts here had to consequently come from outside 
the discipline of post-socialism itself, such as Naomi Klein’s Shock Doctrine (2007).
Many scholars now express their discontent that the literature on post-social-
ism is inadequately appreciated by the wider academic world; it is either little 
engaged with in terms of the broader understanding of global urban change or just 
imports ideas already well-rehearsed elsewhere without feeding back to inform 
the broader debates (Sjöberg 2014; Ferenčuhová 2016). Some searches for the 
relevance of the post-socialist experience in the wider world have, for example, 
flirted with post-colonialism, thus also subjecting transition to the ideas radiating 
from the world’s other corners – even if with inconclusive results as to whether 
post-colonialism and post-socialist are indeed good bedfellows (Hörschelmann 
and Stenning 2008; Hladík 2011; Moore 2001).
I believe there is a much stronger potential in the “post-socialism” subject to 
influence wider scholarship given its phenomenal experiences of radical societal 
change. However, in order to achieve this we must revert the tendencies of reject-
ing imagining transition as a holistic teleology or ideology. There is a need to 
step back from ascribing everything to the idiosyncrasies of change and to see 
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the forest through the trees to fully appreciate the emergent co-constitution of 
parts and the whole; that is, to more explicitly critique transition as a totality, as 
an ideological hegemony, however particularized it may be at varied scales of 
concrete material experiences and co-constituted by these experiences and their 
agency (cf. Giddens 1984).
I will discuss this more in the next section, but first a word of caution: this 
should not be read as simply another guise of neoliberalism, especially if the lat-
ter is taken as an all- and self-explanatory narrative. While transition has been 
part and parcel of neoliberalization, it nevertheless has a specific context at play 
– the communist ideology alternative to capitalism – and hence transition has 
been by far more far-reaching and dogmatic than the operations of neoliberalism 
 elsewhere. It is even naïve to assume that the neoclassical thought and pro-growth 
competitive agenda underpinning the execution of neoliberalism elsewhere were 
the only benchmark for designing and implementing the project of transition. 
Gowan (1995) argued that transition was not so much an economic mission as 
a chance to reorganize the geopolitical balance of power in favor of the hegem-
ony of Western capital. According to Burawoy and Verdery (1999), neoclassical 
economics only happened to exhibit the right excuse of this morality by insisting 
that markets could spontaneously create a good world once the old one was first 
destroyed.
Contrary to the previous adjustment and liberalization reforms in the Global 
South or pro-market development-oriented “transition” in China, transition in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has specifically targeted the social constitution 
of the affected nations. This point is exemplified by Wedel (1998, 21) who, reflect-
ing on the differences in the Western approach toward reforms in the Second and 
Third Worlds, indicates that the reform project in CEE has been not so much about 
exercising economic development as about exorcizing the heresy of communism:
The Second World had been “misdeveloped,” not “underdeveloped” as the Third World, 
pundits said. Aid to India, as an example, tended to be couched mainly in terms of 
economic growth, not institutional and social change. But exorcising the legacies of 
communism in the Second World often required changing the very nature of recipient 
institutions, including those of banking, industry, international trade, social security, and 
health care.
Transition has been a more dogmatic and, one can say, geo-ideological version 
of applied neoliberalism – in other words, quite a different beast, which as such 
requires more than the universalizing prose of neoliberalization. The geo-ideology 
of transition is, however, bigger than the “Second World” – transition has been a 
project of planetary significance, transforming, for example, the internal politi-
cal economy of the West itself, as much as that of the Rest. This wider relevance 
of transition, beyond the geographies of ex-socialist states, is important for the 
understanding of the recent global transformations more widely. I will now turn 
to outline this function of transition.
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The totalizing nature of transition
A starting point is to understand transition not simply as a technocratic project 
envisaged by the neoliberal teleology, which in fact collapses into various transfor-
mational exigencies, but rather appreciate transition as, above all, both ideological 
and totalizing. It is ideological because it is based on particular assumptions and 
worldviews, particular philosophies of economic and political development. It is 
totalizing because whatever your ideological predispositions you cannot escape 
it – it is all-encompassing. Indeed, transition has been one inescapable compulsion 
that has fundamentally transformed the life and circumstances of all people and 
places in post-socialist societies – irrespective of their existing situations, aspirations, 
or individual or collective choice.
The totalizing reach of “transition” does not mean that everything can be 
reduced solely to the level of totality; it rather needs be understood through 
the Lefebvrian conceptualization of totality as synchronically co-present levels of 
social practice in which “one level mediates the other” and can dominate the other 
(Goonewardena 2008, 127). Lefebvre ([1970] 2003) discusses three such levels: the 
macro-level, the mixed/urban level, and the micro/private level of social reality. To 
Lefebvre, these are not so much scalar levels in traditional hierarchical imaginaries, 
but rather tools with different granularity to jointly understand forces construing 
modern society, so that each of these “levels” can be traced, for example, at the 
scale of the city.
The macro-level of social practice involves “the most general, and therefore 
the most abstract, although essential, relations, such as capital market and the 
politics of space” (Lefebvre [1970] 2003). It is the level of “society, the state, global 
power and knowledge, institutions, and ideologies” ([1970] 2003, 89); it is the level 
of political power that “makes use of instruments (ideological and scientific)” to 
modify “the distribution of resources, income, and the ‘value’ created by produc-
tive labor (surplus value)” (Lefebvre [1970] 2003, 78). The micro-level involves the 
practice of everyday life, such as housing and habiting, typically seen as “somewhat 
more modest, even unimportant” ([1970] 2003, 80) but in fact representing the 
very orientation of ideology, if not the whole purpose of society. The mixed/urban 
level is then defined as a critical level of social practice that mediates between the 
distant and immediate/everyday order of social reality and ensures the mobiliza-
tion of the urban as a productive force in capitalist society. This understanding of 
the mediating, mixing role of the urban is central to my notion of urbanization of 
transition to which I shall return later; but for the moment, I want to focus on the 
totalizing aspect of transition.
One can argue that the totalizing tendencies of transition make the whole world 
more totalitarian, advanced democracies included. To many thinkers in political 
economy (e.g. Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Georg Lukács), 
“democratic” societies were already more totalitarian than those societies explicitly 
branded as totalitarian, for the totalitarian means and methods in the former are 
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typically less explicitly political and are therefore more easily concealed. According 
to Marcuse (1964, 3):
By virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary industrial 
society tends to be totalitarian. For “totalitarian” is not only a terroristic political coor-
dination of society, but also a non-terroristic economic-technical coordination which 
operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests. It thus precludes the 
emergence of an effective opposition against the whole. Not only a specific form of gov-
ernment or party rule makes for totalitarianism, but also a specific system of production 
and distribution which may well be compatible with a “pluralism” of parties, newspa-
pers, “countervailing powers,” etc.
Transition effectively serves as the closure of global pluralism by neutralizing “actu-
ally existing socialism” as an alternative point of reference, thus extolling capitalism 
as the only viable universal system – as most vividly expressed by Fukuyama’s 
(1992) “end of history.”
Since transition is based historically on a particular form of capitalist ideology 
– neoliberalism – it has just pushed the world further into the triumph of neoliber-
alism. The closure of socialism as an alternative can explain why the expectations 
of many about the end of neoliberalism and the installation of a system modeled 
after Keynesianism following the crisis of neoliberalism of 2007–2008 turned out 
to be premature, if not entirely naïve (for some discussions, Smith 2008; Birch and 
Mykhnenko 2010; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010; Stiglitz 2011; Aalbers 2013). 
In this light, “the strange non-death of neo-liberalism” (Crouch 2011) is not that 
strange at all: there is simply no longer an alternative vision in sight with which 
to imagine an alternative future – or, indeed, a future as such, distinctive from the 
endless spiral of the present at this end (or side) of history.
Is it not rather disturbing to see how well the words of Marcuse above resonate 
with those below by Doreen Massey half a century later (2015, 35, 36)?
It is one of the ghastly ironies of the present neoliberal age that we are told … that 
much of our power and our pleasure, and our very self-identification, lies in our ability to 
choose (and we are indeed bombarded every day by “choices,” many of them meaning-
less, others we wish we didn’t have to make), while at the level that really matters – what 
kind of society we’d like to live in, what kind of future we’d like to build – we are told, 
implacably, that, give or take a few minor variations, there is no alternative – no choice 
at all.
Neil Smith (2009, 51) argued that:
One of the greatest violences of the neoliberal era was the closure of the political imag-
ination. Even on the left, perhaps especially so, the sense became pervasive that there 
was no alternative to capitalism.
Smith attributes this loss of political imagination to three factors: (a) the collapse 
of state socialism; (b) defeat of anti-colonial movements; and (c) defeat of the 
revolts of the 1960s. One can further argue that out of these three, the first is most 
significant, as it is state socialism that was very much a key factor underpinning 
the other two, including anti-colonial movements and inspiring in different ways 
the revolts of the 1960s.
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The end of communism has consequently prompted many to talk about a 
post-democratic world. As Žižek (1994, 1) argues, before the collapse of socialism,
[E]verybody was busy imagining different forms of the social organization of produc-
tion and commerce … today as Fredric Jameson [2003] perspicaciously remarked, 
nobody seriously considers possible alternatives to capitalism any longer … it seems 
easier to imagine the “end of the world” than a far more modest change in the mode of 
production.
This closure of the alternative economic and ideological imagination by transition 
uncovers the full extent of its totalitarian nature. There is no longer an intellectual 
point of reference from where to (out)source an alternative imagination – transition 
has discredited state socialism into a “post-political” consensus. Hardt and Negri 
(2000, 245) in their Empire quote US President Truman saying in 1947 the follow-
ing: “At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose 
between alternative ways of life.” Now even authors such as Swyngedouw (2010), 
when speculating about how the idea of communism can be a social alternative, 
are derogative of the experiences of the “actually existing socialism,” thus further 
disempowering its history from the future and subscribing themselves to the very 
post-political, post-democratic consensus they critique. It seems more convenient 
for them to imagine a disconsensus over climate change than over recent human 
history.
As many post-socialist scholars demonstrate, things got worse under transition 
as it has been experienced – the economic collapse and marginalization, the rise 
of poverty and inequality, class division, the loss of prospects and hope for better 
life for many, uneven development, environmentally and ethically destructive con-
sumerism, inter-ethnic conflicts and intolerance, the loss of social cohesion – to 
mention just a few. If things have gone worse, does it mean they were better under 
state socialism? This only logical extension to the explicit reflections about the 
elements of superiority in the social organization under state socialism is, however, 
more or less a political taboo – exactly because of the totalizing, collective schiz-
ophrenia of transition. I recall here my conversation with one of the high-profile 
ideologues of the Russian reforms, still a prominent mastermind behind economic 
policy-making in Russia, who, when I asked him about his opinion of the large 
human cost of shock therapy in Russia in the 1990s, replied pompously: “to me 
everything is justified as long as there are no longer communists in power.” It 
seems that this fundamentalism is more than corrupt ethics – it is the currency 
of transition.
Davidow (1976, 238), an American journalist writing about the Soviet city, 
complained from within the cold war: “A half-century of unremitting anti-Soviet, 
anti-Communist propaganda has created an atmosphere in which there is one 
unforgivable sin – to portray Soviet life and communism favorably” (italic in origi-
nal). As Hardt and Negri (2000, 278) further recognize,
In the capitalist world, the massive cold war propaganda and the extraordinary ideo-
logical machine of falsification and misinformation prevented us from seeing the real 
8   O. GOLUBCHIKOV
developments in Soviet society and the political dialectics that unfolded there. Cold 
war ideology called that society totalitarian, but in fact it was a society criss-crossed by 
extremely strong instances of creativity and freedom, just as strong as the rhythms of 
economic development and cultural modernization.
This is not to suggest that academic work shies away from problematizing the new 
hegemony; revisionist accounts that reengage with the history of state socialism 
and challenge the Western-centric imaginaries over socialist “pastness” are not 
that uncommon, even in the West (for a recent interesting example to that point 
see, Imre 2016). But on a general level, it is safe to generalize that transition has 
rendered the “sin” that Davidow (1976) refers to – perhaps “ideological mist” is a 
better wording – an unquestionable truism, even without the repressive apparatus 
of the cold war state.
The heydays of Keynesianism still provide inspirations – for some of its remarka-
ble social achievements, although, of course, Keynesianism itself was created with 
reference to the competition with the “actually existing socialism.” But through the 
ideological mist that transition has made, even for critical intellectuals the (hi)story 
of actually existing socialism is now closed. This is despite that for many of those 
who experienced state socialism – the quick history of which in most countries 
will be soon surpassed by the length of “transition” – those experiences remain 
an important point of reference: not the totalitarian totality of socialism, but the 
dimensions of social justice and freedom it offered – freedom from needs, from ine-
quality, from consumerism, from exploitation, from uncertainties, from becoming an 
outcast, from violence, and so on and so forth – above all, freedom to have a dream 
about freedom. However, as Žižek (2002, 2) claims, now “we ‘feel free’ because we 
lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom.” As Boyer (2006) vividly shows 
in his analysis of the East/West divide in the united Germany, the Western epistemic 
communities systematically derogate any memory about state-socialism’s superior-
ity as the inferiority of backward “Ostalgie”; by marginalizing it, the West is able to 
keep sole control over the country’s future. How cannot this remind us of Orwell’s 
famous: “He who controls the past controls the future. He who controls the present 
controls the past” (Nineteen Eighty-Four). But these are exactly the geo-ideological 
terms of transition on which the East is incorporated into the Occident.
The spatialization of transition and subsumption of legacy
The totalizing nature of transition does not eliminate the importance of seeing 
how it is contextualized and mediated on the ground, including the micro/private 
level of social reality in Lefebvrian conceptualization. Indeed, it is by generalized 
contextualization that the totalitarian status of transition as ideology is achieved 
in practice, is materialized, as it penetrates all spheres and displaces alternatives. 
Transition is not simply radiating from some commanding heights and spreading 
across different cultures; it is also articulated and contextualized from within the 
societies themselves on which it is imposed.
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Stenning et al. (2010, 3, 4) rightly argue that neoliberalism is “domesticated” 
through engagement in everyday life’s economic practices:
[A] focus on the mundane practices of economic life enables a detailed understand-
ing of how neo-liberalism is understood, negotiated, contested and made tolerable in 
homes, communities and workplaces; how neo-liberalism is lived in articulation with a 
host of economic, political and social others; and how those practices are themselves 
involved in the remaking of neo-liberalism.
It is here, in the realm of practiced transition, that we can talk about the conversion 
of the totalizing ideology into particularized transformations. However, this is essen-
tially an ordered, hierarchical process – the ideology of neoliberalism-cum-transi-
tion is inescapable, as it subjugates and modifies pre-existing terms of social order, 
the meanings and dynamics of social and economic relations, changing not simply 
institutions, regulations and property rights, but the state of mind, consciousness, 
and the way of life. Domesticating neoliberalism is simultaneously the neoliberal-
ization of the everyday, the appropriation of the everyday by capitalism and using 
it as the raw material, conduit, or agency of its expansion. Transition is not simply 
domesticated by local practices, it subsumes them in the first place.
This can be conceptualized as “the spatialization of transition” – its material-
ization in specific contexts and workings over pre-existing practices. Transition 
is spatialized, like other hegemonic ideologies. Here, one can again invoke the 
Lefebvrian argument that “every society … produces a space, its own space” 
(Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 31). As Harvey (2006, 78) notes:
Capitalist activity is always grounded somewhere. Diverse material processes (physical, 
ecological as well as social) must be appropriated, used, bent and re-shaped to the pur-
poses and paths of capital accumulation. Conversely, capital accumulation has to adapt 
to and in some instances be transformed by the material conditions it encounters.
Through the process of spatialization, transition allows the new regime to alien-
ate pre-existing legacies from their ideological history. As we argued elsewhere, 
capitalist practice feeds on the legacies of state socialism, making them the infra-
structure, and often the agency, for its own expansion (Golubchikov, Badyina, and 
Makhrova 2014). As a result, transition may reveal variegated forms. At face value, 
those forms may be similar in appearances to the previous (socialist) forms – and 
may even be confused as “socialist” in function; indeed, scholars of post-socialist 
geographies even identify a specter of urban forms – from “pure socialist” (still 
little affected by transition) to “pure capitalist” (totally transformed or created by 
transition). But this is wrong.
It is hard to find any concept that is more widely used and yet so frequently 
abused in the post-socialist scholarship as “legacy” (and “path dependence” as its 
extension). At first glance, post-socialism is all about legacy – at the end of the day 
it is the history of socialism that makes post-socialist spaces so unique. Socialist 
spaces are “remembered” for their distinctive “appearances” such as, for example, 
the uniform residential high-rises, large collective public spaces, or monumen-
tality in urban design. But even where not unique in form and function, “socialist 
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geographies,” such as socialist-era industrial landscapes and built environments, 
are categorized as “slow-to-change socialist legacies.” Continuities here tend to 
be over-emphasized to the fetishism of legacy and neglect the fluid nature of 
legacies themselves. The historicity of post-socialist geography is then mystified 
by these “legacies” so that the very process of post-socialist transition is imagined 
along the binaries of “legacies vs. change” – the less legacy that remains, the 
further transition (into capitalism) goes. Even the rapidly escalating patterns 
of uneven spatial development and social inequalities are also ascribed to this 
“path-dependent” process, so that, for example, the degree of embeddedness 
in socialist era conditions which places are more or less successful in the market 
economy.
However, legacy is never fixed in the past, it is rather interpreted, co-produced 
by the present. The understanding of transition as totalizing helps to better see 
that. Once (neoliberal) capitalism is imposed by transition on the formerly socialist 
geographies (including their productive assets, infrastructure, housing, but also 
everyday life more generally), it assigns a particular meaning to “legacy,” which 
would have been different should the very same legacy have been embraced by 
a different regime. Rather than being an independent constant, socialist legacy is 
subsumed by capitalism and is alienated from its own history to become conducive 
to the capitalist processes themselves. Legacy is an important factor of change, 
but it is mediated by, more than it mediates, transition.
We have previously conceptualized this mutual but hierarchical embedded-
ness of capitalism and socialist legacy as “the hybrid spatialities of transition” (as 
opposed to path-dependent transition), which, according to Golubchikov, Badyina, 
and Makhrova (2014), represent “strange geographies” that function according to 
the tune of capital but often conceal their capitalist nature with “legacies,” even 
though the latter have quintessentially been alienated from their ideological, 
institutional, and economic history. Hybrid spatialities represent the mutual con-
tainment and reconciliation of otherwise highly contradictory tensions between 
the spatial ideologies of state-socialism inscribed into the previously egalitarian 
landscape of economic geography and those of neoliberalism with its anti-egali-
tarian and exploitative effects.
In other words, the social and physical conditions of cities and their fortunes 
may seem to depend on their geography and legacy, but the root causes of their 
crises or otherwise are in the existing socio-political system – which twists, distorts, 
or recreates the meanings of the inherited landscape in its own image. This is why 
when under state-socialism the geographical differences served the egalitarian 
project of equalizing development, under capitalism, as Harvey (2010, 290) con-
tends, even minor inequalities “get magnified and compounded over time into 
huge inequalities of influence, wealth and power.”
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Urbanization of transition
Through the process of spatialization, transition allows capitalism to penetrate all 
pores of social life and transform it. But this is importantly mediated by urbaniza-
tion (broadly understood). Usually the focus of post-socialist urban scholarship is 
only on how cities are changing in response to their exposure to capitalism and 
to associated social and politico-economic changes, leading to particular forms of 
post-socialist urban transformation. However, it is very much urban experiences 
themselves through which transition has taken its practical contours and disci-
plining power and by which it produces new social structures and relationships.
As a starting point, let us consider Brenner and Theodore’s argument (2002, 28):
[C]ities are not merely localized arenas in which broader global or national projects 
of neoliberal restructuring unfold … [C]ities have become increasingly central to the 
reproduction, mutation, and continual reconstitution of neoliberalism itself … [C]ities 
have become strategic targets for an increasingly broad range of neoliberal policy 
experiments, institutional innovations, and politico-ideological projects. Under these 
conditions, cities have become the incubators for many of the major political and ideo-
logical strategies through which the dominance of neoliberalism is being maintained …
This understanding echoes Lefebvre ([1970] 2003), to whom, as I noted before, the 
urban plays a key role in mixing, mediating between the macro-dimensions of the 
social order and the micro-reality of everyday life. The production of urban space 
thus contributes to hegemony by fusing the immediate realm of lived space with 
the larger social order. Here, the production of space is not limited to the projec-
tion of regimes and ideologies onto the urban, but it is part of the production of 
social relationships:
The urban phenomenon and urban space are not only a projection of social relation-
ships but also a terrain on which various strategies clash. They are in no sense goals or 
objectives, but means and instruments of actions. (Lefebvre [1970] 2003, 87)
Lefebvre ([1970] 2003) argues that the latest stages of capitalism are character-
ized by a transition from industrialization to urbanization as the totalizing social 
“episteme.” As Prigge (2008, 49) explains this:
It is no longer the industrial and its disciplines focusing on capital and labor, classes 
and reproduction that constitute the episteme (the possibility of knowing the social for-
mation), but the urban and its forms focused on everydayness and consumption, plan-
ning and spectacle, that expose the tendencies of social development … Compared to 
homogeneous industrial space, urban space is differentially constituted. This heteroge-
neous structure predestines urban space to clarify contemporary social forms.
This understanding can also be traced in the analysis of demand-side urbanization 
in much of David Harvey’s work on the urbanization of capital and urbanization 
of consciousness (Harvey 1985a, 1985b, 1989). In Consciousness and the Urban 
Experience, Harvey (1985a, 262) notes:
Individuals draw their sense of identity and shape their consciousness out of the mate-
rial bases given by the individualism of money, the class relations of capital, the limited 
coherence of community, the contested legitimacy of the state, and the protected but 
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vulnerable domain of family life. But they also do so in the context of how these mate-
rial bases intersect within a produced urban milieu that institutionalizes and reifies the 
social and physical pattering of all such human relations in space and time. The urbani-
zation of capital – so vital to capitalism’s survival as a dominant mode of production and 
consumption – entails a particular configuration of these different loci of consciousness 
formation.
Post-socialist transition too is aligned with the epistemic transition from industri-
alization to urbanization as the locus of consciousness formation. While the logic 
of social development under socialism was much bound to industrialization (social 
and spatial regulations were contingent on the industrial), post-socialism makes a 
transition to consumption and urbanization (social and spatial regulations are con-
tingent on the urban). As Russian political philosopher Sergey Kara-Murza (2005) 
suggests, the rapid processes of privatization, focused on the socialist-era industrial 
sector, were succeeded by more far-reaching processes of the consolidation of 
capital over, and colonization of, the domain of the everyday, of the domain of the 
urban. Indeed, under the conditions of de-industrialization (also underpinned by 
the break-up of former supply chains), the urban domain offered new, wider, and 
more sustained opportunities for accumulation strategies. The processes of the 
subsumption of the pre-existing materialities and practices have become more 
focused on everyday life and urban space rather than on productive assets.
Although the focus of socialist development was on the real sector of produc-
tion, the city of socialism (at least where socialism took its advanced forms, such as 
in Soviet Russia) played the very important role as a social(ist) contract – providing 
quality of life to working people in exchange for their labor in the production 
process. This philosophy has been antagonistic to the capitalist logic of private 
profit maximizing (as opposed to collective value maximizing). To all the discus-
sion whether cities of communism and cities of capitalism were different or not 
too much (Andrusz, Harloe, and Szelenyi 1996; Hirt 2013), the former were tightly 
bound to very different philosophies.
Making the urban dance to the tune of capitalism and alienating the inherited 
social and urban forms from socialist ideology (that had either generated them 
or previously appropriated them from the pre-socialist regimes) creates serious 
ruptures with the previous philosophy of the city.
Under socialism, value extracted from more productive agents was re-invested 
in less productive sectors and also financed vast (often unproductive in capitalist 
sense) public expenditure, so that the return on re-invested capital was often par-
tial, but the potential was being accumulated for the long-term development of 
social and economic capital. In contrast to that system, the new regime is indeed 
based on the ideology of maximization of profits, reduced public budget, and 
shortened investment horizons.
Through the commodification, financialization, and revalorization of housing, 
real estate, and other urban assets – strategies sought by both markets and reg-
ulations – urban space is very much reduced to the operation of capital. Social 
EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS  13
inequalities, injustices, and uneven development are naturalized by their mystifi-
cation as the “natural conditions” of the circulation of money and commodity and 
people’s divergent skills and luck in acquiring personal wealth to accommodate 
themselves at different levels of consumption. Denouncing and de-legitimizing 
the practices of state socialism as an “unnatural” experiment, national and urban 
regimes of post-socialist transition can only legitimize their push of neoliberaliza-
tion and austerity politics even further than the collective memory of the welfare 
state allows governments in Western Europe.
At the scale of the city, new urban consumption-based semiotics lubricates 
class transformation. While socialist societies were relatively egalitarian and 
structured mostly according to merit and profession, the new society demands 
new class consciousness – new etiquettes, ethics, and esthetics, new semiotics 
for distinguishing social position and status. High levels of income inequality are 
registered everywhere under post-socialism; however, income per se is not a suf-
ficient factor of class division and true social inequality. More significant is how 
income translates into life chances, consumption “freedom,” and social privilege. 
Here, it is the consumption of urban space and segregation (including through 
gentrification and suburbanization) that complete this translation. For example, 
informed by the symbolic meanings of what locations and types of housing are 
“prestigious” or not, housing markets differentiate income groups, who are now in 
search of defining and securing their own class status (Badyina and Golubchikov 
2005; Golubchikov and Badyina 2006). Spatial formations thus work as a medium 
to transform income inequalities into social status – consuming space is what 
sustains social reproduction and iterates classes today, more than, for example, 
industrial-era production-based class struggle. This is a mechanism of the estab-
lishment and reproduction of dominance in the urban society of consumers, more 
aligned with Weber’s vision, rather than a product of more explicit class struggle 
under industrial capitalism, as in Marx’s teaching.
All this, of course, changes the raison d’être of the city. Rather than being a 
vehicle for spatial equalization and redistribution, for a purposeful evolution of 
social consciousness towards “a fair and egalitarian society,” the post-socialist city 
has become a dividing and divided experience – with increasing social and eco-
nomic disparity and polarization at both inter-urban and intra-urban scales. It is 
not only that the principle of the egalitarian re-distribution of wealth was replaced 
with the neoliberal principle of self-reliance, but the new regime has also created 
preconditions for the extraction of wealth from the large majority of people and 
places and its re-concentration in the hands of the select few (people and places).
Conclusions
While studies of post-socialist cities demonstrate much appetite and aptitude 
in investigating various aspects of urbanization under the profound and radical 
politico-economic changes experienced under transition, there is still much room 
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to reveal how post-socialist urban space has been an intensive and oft-cruel bat-
tlefield – over ideas, powers, social, economic, and political practices, identities, 
symbolism, understandings, and meanings. There is still much room to reveal the 
appropriation of urban space through various mechanisms – privatization and 
commodification, investment and disinvestment, violence and conformity, resist-
ance and resilience, negation, interrogation and negotiation, location, relocation 
and displacement, exclusion and segregation, new representations of space, and 
new spaces of representation. There is still much room to reveal different agen-
cies in these rapid and complex processes – state, markets, and people – in their 
different embodiment, organization and identification.
What is particularly missing from the current urban debates is a meta-narrative 
that would match the significance and extent of the meta-change in question. 
Extant studies focus on forms and appearances of urban processes rather than 
on the new ontologies of the urban, which may be understood not simply as a 
reflection or projection of new institutional and social order but as a key mediating 
instrument that “mixes” the ideological and the everyday and thus renders the new 
totalizing ideology its concrete practical contours and control over the production 
and reproduction of social relationships.
My intention in this paper has been to start problematizing the relationships 
between transition and the urban. To this end, I debated the importance of revisit-
ing transition on three key levels, which in their cumulative co-construction offer a 
better understanding of the centrality of the urban in the spectacular post-socialist 
dynamics. Firstly, at the level of ideology, it is important to understand transition 
as a totalizing doctrine, which completes the subjugation of the whole world to 
capitalism and firmly crowns neoliberalism as the only global order. Like the rise of 
state socialism in the twentieth century, transition is a process of planetary reach 
and significance that has already radically changed the destinies of peoples, irre-
spective of whether living within or outside the spaces of (post)socialism. Secondly, 
at the level of practice, it is important to properly account for the spatializing effects 
of that ideology – which is not simply “domesticated,” but subsumes pre-existing 
practices altogether, alienates them from their own ideological history, and recasts 
them under the exigencies of capital(ism). Thirdly, at the level of the urban, while 
urban change is usually portrayed merely as a projection of larger societal changes, 
the urban needs to be seen the central stage through which the societal change is 
mediated; new meanings, social relations, and class divisions are construed; and 
through which transition achieves its practical, corporeal completeness.
Cities are actually an important social framework and material locale for the 
production and reproduction of the new relationships of (neoliberal) capitalism, 
including class (trans)formation and the production of uneven development. The 
urbanization of transition is thus a fulcrum of social and spatial regulation. In other 
words, urbanization is a major institutional dimension of transition, not simply its 
playground.
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